ANALIZAN LUCHA ANTINARCO
Showing posts with label US. Show all posts
Showing posts with label US. Show all posts
Tuesday, March 23, 2010
Operativo por Clinton
Secreatry of State Clinton travelled to Mexico for bilateral discussions on anti-drug cartel actions. Needless to say, securityu was exceedingly tight. Travelling with her were Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano, Secretary of Defense Gates, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Mullen and Director of national intelligence Blair.Both the NY Times and El Universal had stories on the trip; clearly for Mexico it was a much more important deal. The Mexican media outlet had video reports, pictures, and stories. One picture caught my eye.
ANALIZAN LUCHA ANTINARCO
La reunión que encabezan la canciller Patricia Espinosa y la secretaria de Estado de EU, Hillary Clinton, tiene como fin revisar la estrategia conjunta contra el crimen organizado | Ver nota (Foto: NTX)mex
ANALIZAN LUCHA ANTINARCO
Thursday, March 11, 2010
Israeli Faith in Iran's Opposition Gains Favor
Israel's oldest civil servant, 83-year-old Ministry of Defense adviser Uri Lubrani, has spent his career defying conventional wisdom on Iran. Today, Israel's political and military establishment appears to be tilting toward one of his long-ignored views: Israeli support for Iran's opposition movement—and not a miltary strike—is the best way to combat the regime in Tehran.
A voice of reason and moderation, a much needed one.
"A military strike will at best delay Iran's nuclear program, but what's worse, it will rally the Iranian people to the defense of the regime," says Mr. Lubrani, who was ambassador to Iran from 1973 to 1978 and is now a special adviser to Israel's minister of defense. "We must do everything possible to help (the protest movement) do the job."
All the Right Places: A few Lubrani career highlights
* Pre-1948: Fought for Israel's pre-statehood militia.
* 1952-1961: Senior aide to Prime Minister Ben Gurion.
* 1963-1967: Ambassador to Uganda. Survived plane crash with Idi Amin.
* 1967-1971: Ambassador to Ethiopia. Smuggled first Ethiopian Jew to Israel.
* 1973-1978: Iran ambassador.
* 1983-2000: Managed the Israeli government's activities in Lebanon.
Rafi Eitan, an adviser to Mr. Netanyahu, says the protests "changed people's attitudes here. They started to understand that this should be done the way Lubrani has been saying it should be done."
He has quite a track record of understanding Israel's neighbors.
Heading Israeli government activities in Lebanon since 1983, he was one of the first to warn of Iran's growing influence among the country's Shiites. His recommendations were largely neglected and Hezbollah soon emerged as one of Israel's most potent foes. "Lubrani was one of the few, the very few, to identify that Israel should find a way to the Shiites before Iran did," recalls retired Brig. Gen. Shimon Shapira, who was an intelligence officer in Lebanon at the time. More recently, as Iran's nuclear program grew and Washington and Israel hardened their views, Mr. Lubrani's calls to support what appeared to be a beaten-down opposition seemed out of touch.
Admirers point to his track record as reason to heed his advice. Mr. Lubrani was named ambassador to Iran in 1973, after a string of posts as envoy to countries neighboring Israel's Arab enemies. In 1977, Mr. Lubrani was summoned to the Shah's private resort island of Kish—giving him a first-hand look at the bubble of decadence the Shah had retreated into, he says. Kish had a landing strip serving a Concorde jet that airlifted delicacies to the island each day from Paris and kept the island's boutiques stocked with the latest French fashions, recalls Mr. Lubrani. After returning to Tehran, he ran into Iran's long-time prime minister, Amir Abbas Hoveyda, who openly called the island "a pit of corruption and decadence," a striking breach of diplomatic protocol, says Mr. Lubrani.
The US did not then, and one wonders if it does now, understand the negative meaning of the Shah, how hated and corrupt he was; what the US was an anti-communist ally, and ignored the dirty details of his corruption.
Mr. Lubrani warned Israel's foreign minister, Moshe Dayan, that the regime's days were numbered, according to Mr. Lubrani and senior government officials at the time. Harold Rhode, who retired last month after 28 years as a Pentagon analyst, much of it focused on Iran, says "Lubrani's warning got back to Washington, and the CIA laughed at it. The U.S. told Israel it's not true." Mr. Lubrani's successor was evacuated just weeks after arriving in Tehran, as the Islamic Revolution swept the country.
"Uri is by far the best authority Israel has on Iran," says Bernard Lewis, the influential Middle East historian and a decadeslong friend of Mr. Lubrani. "He's demonstrated that on more than one occasion by being right when everybody else was wrong, and he still has difficulty getting anyone to listen to him."
"A military strike will at best delay Iran's nuclear program, but what's worse, it will rally the Iranian people to the defense of the regime," says Mr. Lubrani, who was ambassador to Iran from 1973 to 1978 and is now a special adviser to Israel's minister of defense. "We must do everything possible to help (the protest movement) do the job."
All the Right Places: A few Lubrani career highlights
* Pre-1948: Fought for Israel's pre-statehood militia.
* 1952-1961: Senior aide to Prime Minister Ben Gurion.
* 1963-1967: Ambassador to Uganda. Survived plane crash with Idi Amin.
* 1967-1971: Ambassador to Ethiopia. Smuggled first Ethiopian Jew to Israel.
* 1973-1978: Iran ambassador.
* 1983-2000: Managed the Israeli government's activities in Lebanon.
Rafi Eitan, an adviser to Mr. Netanyahu, says the protests "changed people's attitudes here. They started to understand that this should be done the way Lubrani has been saying it should be done."
He has quite a track record of understanding Israel's neighbors.
Heading Israeli government activities in Lebanon since 1983, he was one of the first to warn of Iran's growing influence among the country's Shiites. His recommendations were largely neglected and Hezbollah soon emerged as one of Israel's most potent foes. "Lubrani was one of the few, the very few, to identify that Israel should find a way to the Shiites before Iran did," recalls retired Brig. Gen. Shimon Shapira, who was an intelligence officer in Lebanon at the time. More recently, as Iran's nuclear program grew and Washington and Israel hardened their views, Mr. Lubrani's calls to support what appeared to be a beaten-down opposition seemed out of touch.
Admirers point to his track record as reason to heed his advice. Mr. Lubrani was named ambassador to Iran in 1973, after a string of posts as envoy to countries neighboring Israel's Arab enemies. In 1977, Mr. Lubrani was summoned to the Shah's private resort island of Kish—giving him a first-hand look at the bubble of decadence the Shah had retreated into, he says. Kish had a landing strip serving a Concorde jet that airlifted delicacies to the island each day from Paris and kept the island's boutiques stocked with the latest French fashions, recalls Mr. Lubrani. After returning to Tehran, he ran into Iran's long-time prime minister, Amir Abbas Hoveyda, who openly called the island "a pit of corruption and decadence," a striking breach of diplomatic protocol, says Mr. Lubrani.
The US did not then, and one wonders if it does now, understand the negative meaning of the Shah, how hated and corrupt he was; what the US was an anti-communist ally, and ignored the dirty details of his corruption.
Mr. Lubrani warned Israel's foreign minister, Moshe Dayan, that the regime's days were numbered, according to Mr. Lubrani and senior government officials at the time. Harold Rhode, who retired last month after 28 years as a Pentagon analyst, much of it focused on Iran, says "Lubrani's warning got back to Washington, and the CIA laughed at it. The U.S. told Israel it's not true." Mr. Lubrani's successor was evacuated just weeks after arriving in Tehran, as the Islamic Revolution swept the country.
"Uri is by far the best authority Israel has on Iran," says Bernard Lewis, the influential Middle East historian and a decadeslong friend of Mr. Lubrani. "He's demonstrated that on more than one occasion by being right when everybody else was wrong, and he still has difficulty getting anyone to listen to him."
Saturday, January 23, 2010
Ven, gringuito
With Jonathan Bornstein's goal in October, the United States tied Costa Rica and set off celebrations in Honduras.
January 23, 2010
U.S. Soccer Player Is National Hero (in Honduras)
By BILLY WITZ
CARSON, Calif. — With the United States trailing by a goal in the waning seconds, Jonathan Bornstein looked at his fellow defender Steve Cherundolo as the team prepared to take a corner kick.
“I was like, hey, dude, one of us should go inside the box,” Bornstein said. “We both don’t need to stay back here.”
And so off Bornstein went, sprinting toward Costa Rica’s goal, where he was about to find out just how far a little initiative could resonate.
When Bornstein headed Robbie Rogers’s corner kick into the net in October, it set off an emotional celebration at R.F.K. Stadium in Washington. Although the result of the final World Cup qualifying match meant little to the United States, which had already advanced to South Africa, the Americans took inspiration from their teammate Charlie Davies, who lay in a nearby hospital after he was involved in a fatal car accident a day earlier.
The interim president, Roberto Micheletti, declared a holiday after Honduras secured its first World Cup berth since 1982.
But the real roar emanated from Honduras, which, with Bornstein’s goal moments after it had beaten El Salvador, 1-0, clinched a berth in the World Cup for the first time since 1982. A country that had been torn by a political coup found a reason, at least for the moment, to coalesce. Hundreds of thousands of people emptied into the streets of the capital, Tegucigalpa. The interim president, Roberto Micheletti, declared the next day a national holiday.
Micheletti, who had been installed as the country’s leader after an army-backed coup ousted President Manuel Zelaya last July, ordered a parade rerouted in front of the presidential palace so that he could pose for photographs with the team.
But he did not forget Bornstein. He offered an all-expenses-paid trip to the resort area Islas de la Bahia.
“We’ll bring this gringuito who scored on the header,” Micheletti said. “He doesn’t need a visa to come here to Honduras.”
On Saturday night, Hondurans will have an opportunity to express their gratitude personally, when Honduras plays the United States in an exhibition here. Bornstein is expected to be at his familiar left back position.
“Growing up, you score goals in club soccer or in college and they maybe help your team win,” said Bornstein, whose goal knocked Costa Rica into a playoff, which it lost to Uruguay. “This goal against Costa Rica had a real impact on a whole nation. It doesn’t just affect me or the team, it affected three countries. That a simple soccer goal could do that is very surreal.”
[highest bid for shoes currently $1,125; 10am, 23 January 2010]
Bornstein has autographed the shoes he wore against Costa Rica, and on Friday he began auctioning them on eBay, the proceeds going to disaster relief in Haiti. The bidding runs until Wednesday, by which time his teammates may stop ribbing him. Some wondered if he would play a half for each team Saturday.
“You might hear some Johnny Bornstein chants,” said Benny Feilhaber, a midfielder for the United States who grew up playing with Bornstein. “They’re in love with Johnny right now.”
Over the last three months, Bornstein’s Facebook page has been peppered with messages thanking him, and a page named Gracias Jonathan Bornstein has been set up. During the United States team’s three-week January training camp, he has been stopped several times leaving the field by Honduran fans who wanted to pose for a photograph with him.
“People are going to remember that name for a long time,” said Alfonso Rosado, a Honduran who has lived in the United States for 14 years.
Rosado was watching the United States-Costa Rica game with friends at his apartment in Long Beach, Calif., fearing the worst. Honduras was on the verge of World Cup berths in 1986 and 2002, only to lose its final qualifiers at home, to Canada and to Trinidad and Tobago.
“When the U.S. scored, we couldn’t believe it,” said Rosado, who watched Honduras work out Thursday night in a cold rain. “We were all jumping up and down. I got a call at 7 the next morning from friends in Honduras, who had been out drinking all night, yelling, ‘Can you believe it?’ ”
For a country that is still plagued by political problems, corruption and crime, the World Cup berth has given Hondurans a rare common cause.
“At that moment, in that day, everyone forgets about all the problems — the crime, the politics — and everyone is together,” Rosado said. “You wonder why we can’t do that on a daily basis, but we know there is at least one thing that can bring us together.”
Bornstein’s goal has opened windows for himself as well. He had understood what it was like to walk onto a soccer field in Central America as an unwelcome visitor, dodging coins, cups of beer and worse. Now he knows of at least one place where he can return to a warmer reception. He has looked into the Islas de la Bahia; a cabana amid the palm trees, sandy beaches and warm tropical waters does have its appeal.
So, about that next vacation?
“Maybe forever Honduras will be a good spot to go,” Bornstein said. “I’m going to keep those options open.”
January 23, 2010
U.S. Soccer Player Is National Hero (in Honduras)
By BILLY WITZ
CARSON, Calif. — With the United States trailing by a goal in the waning seconds, Jonathan Bornstein looked at his fellow defender Steve Cherundolo as the team prepared to take a corner kick.
“I was like, hey, dude, one of us should go inside the box,” Bornstein said. “We both don’t need to stay back here.”
And so off Bornstein went, sprinting toward Costa Rica’s goal, where he was about to find out just how far a little initiative could resonate.
When Bornstein headed Robbie Rogers’s corner kick into the net in October, it set off an emotional celebration at R.F.K. Stadium in Washington. Although the result of the final World Cup qualifying match meant little to the United States, which had already advanced to South Africa, the Americans took inspiration from their teammate Charlie Davies, who lay in a nearby hospital after he was involved in a fatal car accident a day earlier.
The interim president, Roberto Micheletti, declared a holiday after Honduras secured its first World Cup berth since 1982.
But the real roar emanated from Honduras, which, with Bornstein’s goal moments after it had beaten El Salvador, 1-0, clinched a berth in the World Cup for the first time since 1982. A country that had been torn by a political coup found a reason, at least for the moment, to coalesce. Hundreds of thousands of people emptied into the streets of the capital, Tegucigalpa. The interim president, Roberto Micheletti, declared the next day a national holiday.
Micheletti, who had been installed as the country’s leader after an army-backed coup ousted President Manuel Zelaya last July, ordered a parade rerouted in front of the presidential palace so that he could pose for photographs with the team.
But he did not forget Bornstein. He offered an all-expenses-paid trip to the resort area Islas de la Bahia.
“We’ll bring this gringuito who scored on the header,” Micheletti said. “He doesn’t need a visa to come here to Honduras.”
On Saturday night, Hondurans will have an opportunity to express their gratitude personally, when Honduras plays the United States in an exhibition here. Bornstein is expected to be at his familiar left back position.
“Growing up, you score goals in club soccer or in college and they maybe help your team win,” said Bornstein, whose goal knocked Costa Rica into a playoff, which it lost to Uruguay. “This goal against Costa Rica had a real impact on a whole nation. It doesn’t just affect me or the team, it affected three countries. That a simple soccer goal could do that is very surreal.”
[highest bid for shoes currently $1,125; 10am, 23 January 2010]
Bornstein has autographed the shoes he wore against Costa Rica, and on Friday he began auctioning them on eBay, the proceeds going to disaster relief in Haiti. The bidding runs until Wednesday, by which time his teammates may stop ribbing him. Some wondered if he would play a half for each team Saturday.
“You might hear some Johnny Bornstein chants,” said Benny Feilhaber, a midfielder for the United States who grew up playing with Bornstein. “They’re in love with Johnny right now.”
Over the last three months, Bornstein’s Facebook page has been peppered with messages thanking him, and a page named Gracias Jonathan Bornstein has been set up. During the United States team’s three-week January training camp, he has been stopped several times leaving the field by Honduran fans who wanted to pose for a photograph with him.
“People are going to remember that name for a long time,” said Alfonso Rosado, a Honduran who has lived in the United States for 14 years.
Rosado was watching the United States-Costa Rica game with friends at his apartment in Long Beach, Calif., fearing the worst. Honduras was on the verge of World Cup berths in 1986 and 2002, only to lose its final qualifiers at home, to Canada and to Trinidad and Tobago.
“When the U.S. scored, we couldn’t believe it,” said Rosado, who watched Honduras work out Thursday night in a cold rain. “We were all jumping up and down. I got a call at 7 the next morning from friends in Honduras, who had been out drinking all night, yelling, ‘Can you believe it?’ ”
For a country that is still plagued by political problems, corruption and crime, the World Cup berth has given Hondurans a rare common cause.
“At that moment, in that day, everyone forgets about all the problems — the crime, the politics — and everyone is together,” Rosado said. “You wonder why we can’t do that on a daily basis, but we know there is at least one thing that can bring us together.”
Bornstein’s goal has opened windows for himself as well. He had understood what it was like to walk onto a soccer field in Central America as an unwelcome visitor, dodging coins, cups of beer and worse. Now he knows of at least one place where he can return to a warmer reception. He has looked into the Islas de la Bahia; a cabana amid the palm trees, sandy beaches and warm tropical waters does have its appeal.
So, about that next vacation?
“Maybe forever Honduras will be a good spot to go,” Bornstein said. “I’m going to keep those options open.”
Wednesday, January 13, 2010
Israeli robots remake battlefield
Sixty years of near-constant war, a low tolerance for enduring casualties in conflict, and its high-tech industry have long made Israel one of the world's leading innovators of military robotics.
A tiny country is one of the world's leading high-tech hubs.
Over 40 countries have military-robotics programs today. The U.S. and much of the rest of the world is betting big on the role of aerial drones: Even Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Shiite guerrilla force in Lebanon, flew four Iranian-made drones against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War.
One shudders to think of Hezbollah using drones.
When the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, it had just a handful of drones. Today, U.S. forces have around 7,000 unmanned vehicles in the air and an additional 12,000 on the ground, used for tasks including reconnaissance, airstrikes and bomb disposal.
7,000 aerial drones produce an overwhelming volume of data.
In 10 to 15 years, one-third of Israel's military machines will be unmanned, predicts Giora Katz, vice president of Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd., one of Israel's leading weapons manufacturers.
"The Israelis do it differently, not because they're more clever than we are, but because they live in a tough neighborhood and need to respond fast to operational issues," says Thomas Tate, a former U.S. Army lieutenant colonel who now oversees defense cooperation between the U.S. and Israel.
Their needs are too great to allow them to get bogged down. Every Israeli knows that the nation's security depends on getting things done.
A fascinating website of a company with some innovative products. Rafael, too, is a fascinating website.
That is the Protector.
Military analysts say unmanned fighting vehicles could have a far-reaching strategic impact on the sort of asymmetrical conflicts the U.S. is fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan and that Israel faces against enemies such as Hezbollah and Hamas. In such conflicts, robotic vehicles will allow modern conventional armies to minimize the advantages guerrilla opponents gain by their increased willingness to sacrifice their lives in order to inflict casualties on the enemy.
Suicide bombers could be partially neutralized with such technology.
However, there are also fears that when countries no longer fear losing soldiers' lives in combat thanks to the ability to wage war with unmanned vehicles, they may prove more willing to initiate conflict.
A legitimate concern.
In coming years, engineers say unmanned air, sea and ground vehicles will increasingly work together without any human involvement. Israel and the U.S. have already faced backlash over civilian deaths caused by drone-fired missiles in Gaza, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Those ethical dilemmas could increase as robots become more independent of their human masters.
Independence?
Saturday, January 9, 2010
Ay, Hugo
AMERICAS NEWS - JANUARY 9, 2010
Venezuela Says Its Jets Intercepted U.S. Plane
CARACAS -- President Hugo Chávez said he ordered two F-16 jets to intercept a U.S. military plane that twice violated Venezuelan airspace on Friday in what he called the latest provocation in the South American nation's skies. Brandishing a photo of the plane, which he described as a P-3, Mr. Chávez said the overflight was the latest incursion in Venezuelan skies by the U.S. military from its bases on the Netherlands' Caribbean islands and from neighboring Colombia.
So, his foto is good, but the Colombian photos showing FARC camps in Ecuador and Venezuela are fraudulent?
* Venezuela Devalues Its Currency
There was no immediate response from the U.S. Defense Department or the White House.
What are they gonna say?
Separately, Mr. Chávez announced a currency devaluation for the first time since 2005. The president said Venezuela's currency, the bolivar, will now have two government-set rates depending on the use, either 2.60 to the dollar for transactions deemed priorities by the government or 4.30 to the dollar for other transactions. The currency's official exchange rate has been held by the government at 2.15 bolivars to the dollar.
On the plane interception, Mr. Chávez said the F-16s escorted the U.S. plane away after two incursions lasting 15 and 19 minutes each. The perceived threat of U.S. intervention has become a central element of Mr. Chávez's political discourse and a rallying cry for his supporters.
An external threat diverts attention from internal matters.
Foes say the president is hyping the idea of a foreign threat to distract Venezuelans from domestic problems such as a recession and inadequate public services. Mr. Chávez surprised the diplomatic world in December when he accused the Netherlands of abetting potential offensive action against his government by granting U.S. troops access to its islands close to Venezuela.
The Dutch government says the U.S. presence is only for counternarcotics and surveillance operations over Caribbean smuggling routes.
Venezuela Says Its Jets Intercepted U.S. Plane
CARACAS -- President Hugo Chávez said he ordered two F-16 jets to intercept a U.S. military plane that twice violated Venezuelan airspace on Friday in what he called the latest provocation in the South American nation's skies. Brandishing a photo of the plane, which he described as a P-3, Mr. Chávez said the overflight was the latest incursion in Venezuelan skies by the U.S. military from its bases on the Netherlands' Caribbean islands and from neighboring Colombia.
So, his foto is good, but the Colombian photos showing FARC camps in Ecuador and Venezuela are fraudulent?
* Venezuela Devalues Its Currency
There was no immediate response from the U.S. Defense Department or the White House.
What are they gonna say?
Separately, Mr. Chávez announced a currency devaluation for the first time since 2005. The president said Venezuela's currency, the bolivar, will now have two government-set rates depending on the use, either 2.60 to the dollar for transactions deemed priorities by the government or 4.30 to the dollar for other transactions. The currency's official exchange rate has been held by the government at 2.15 bolivars to the dollar.
On the plane interception, Mr. Chávez said the F-16s escorted the U.S. plane away after two incursions lasting 15 and 19 minutes each. The perceived threat of U.S. intervention has become a central element of Mr. Chávez's political discourse and a rallying cry for his supporters.
An external threat diverts attention from internal matters.
Foes say the president is hyping the idea of a foreign threat to distract Venezuelans from domestic problems such as a recession and inadequate public services. Mr. Chávez surprised the diplomatic world in December when he accused the Netherlands of abetting potential offensive action against his government by granting U.S. troops access to its islands close to Venezuela.
The Dutch government says the U.S. presence is only for counternarcotics and surveillance operations over Caribbean smuggling routes.
Tuesday, December 22, 2009
Shoot them down
Radio Netherlands Worldwide, a Dutch site, has story about Colonel Hugo Chávez and his charge of the US flying spy drones over Venezuela. Picture is of Curaçao's Hato Airport.
Dutch MP: Curaçao is US spy base
Published on : 22 December 2009 - 9:34am | By RNW News Desk
Dutch Socialist MP Harry van Bommel has claimed that US spy planes are using an airbase on the Netherlands Antilles island of Curaçao.
Mr Van Bommel has asked Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen whether he is aware that a Boeing RC-135 aircraft has been making regular reconnaissance flights from the Caribbean island's Hato airport over the past few weeks.
Now, if that is indeed the case, is the government supposed to acknowledge it? If not, i sthe Foreign Minister supposed to say, no, I was not aware of what my government is doing?
War on drugs
The flights were the cause of angry reactions by Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, who accused the Netherlands of colluding with the United States. The Hague government is contributing to rising tensions between Venezuela and Colombia, according to the Venezuelan authorities.
Chávez's tactics are to create hornet's nests and create the illusion that Venezuela is on the verge of being invaded. There is nothing better than an external enemy.
The opposition MP said it is up to the Netherlands to help de-escalate these tensions. He is asking for a ban on American military flights over Colombia from the Antilles. Ostensibly such flights are part of the US "war on drugs" but Mr Van Bommel claims they are also used in a "war on guerrillas". The MP wants to scrap the US-Netherlands Forwards Operations Location treaty enabling the Americans to use airfields in Curaçao and the Antilles for anti-drugs flights.
If, indeed, these flights are being used fro anti-guerrilla purposes, why would either the US or the Colombian government want to stop them?
Shoot them down
Meanwhile President Chávez has ordered his airforce to shoot down any US plane entering Venezuelan airspace. He said on state television that a US drone, an unmanned plane, had attempted to enter from Colombia on Sunday. Since an agreement with the Colombian government was signed in October, the US military have access to seven military bases in Colombia.
What a coup that would be, to have a shot down drone for display. One supposes that Hugo s not going to be giving his friend Obama another copy of Eduaredo Galeano's book any time soon.
Friday, December 18, 2009
Hugo's paranoia
This item is from Pravda: Chavez Laughs in Hillary Clinton's Face and Awards War Prize to Obama
Story starts: Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez harshly criticized the US-led politics at the close of ALBA – the summit of leftist Latin American nations – in Havana. Chavez stated that the USA encircled Venezuela with army bases in Puerto Rico, Aruba, Curazao and Columbia, where the US army gained access to seven army bases. The USA will never be able to defeat Venezuela even if Americans build a thousand of bases, the Venezuelan leader said, Itar-Tass reports.
Columbia?
Chavez says Obama should give the Nobel back, plotting attack
Dutch deny Chavez aggression claim
Fidel's great lesson to Hugo: always keep an external enemy. This is a good one, too: Holland is conspiring with the US to invade Venezuela, and using Aruba as a launching pad. The tourists at the resorts must be hiding surface-to-air missiles in their rooms, too.
Story starts: Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez harshly criticized the US-led politics at the close of ALBA – the summit of leftist Latin American nations – in Havana. Chavez stated that the USA encircled Venezuela with army bases in Puerto Rico, Aruba, Curazao and Columbia, where the US army gained access to seven army bases. The USA will never be able to defeat Venezuela even if Americans build a thousand of bases, the Venezuelan leader said, Itar-Tass reports.
Columbia?
Chavez says Obama should give the Nobel back, plotting attack
Dutch deny Chavez aggression claim
Aljazeera.net - 6 hours ago
Bart Rijs, a foreign ministry spokesman, said on Friday that none of the territories in the Kingdom of the Netherlands - including Aruba and the Netherland ...
Dutch deny Venezuela's claim of US attack plans The Associated Press
Fidel's great lesson to Hugo: always keep an external enemy. This is a good one, too: Holland is conspiring with the US to invade Venezuela, and using Aruba as a launching pad. The tourists at the resorts must be hiding surface-to-air missiles in their rooms, too.
Thursday, December 17, 2009
$26 software hacks drones
This is an amazing story. SOmeone in the Pentagon should be thinking of resigning over it: using software that costs 26 bucks, available off the shelf, U.S. drones have been hacked. The Journal's subheading includes the phrase Iranian backing suspected, but it should say 650 billion dollar military thwarted by 26 buck software major embarrassment.
Saturday, November 28, 2009
After Cheney
IN THE FIELD Biden meeting in Baghdad with Gen. Raymond T. Odierno and Christopher Hill, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq.
An interesting article about Biden as Vice President. His experience in the Senate, his personality, his garrulousness, his role in the Obama administration, his succession of Cheney.
Some details from the story stand out for me.
First, this web and tangle of relationships: while Cheney’s staff fought for dominance with the White House, Biden’s is deeply enmeshed in the policy-making structure. His national-security adviser, Antony J. Blinken, and two other aides are also directors in the National Security Council, while a number of former Biden aides occupy important posts in the N.S.C. Thomas Donilon, deputy national-security adviser and coordinator of policy across agencies, has been a close friend of Biden’s since the 1980s; Donilon’s brother, Michael, is a senior adviser to Biden, and Donilon’s wife, Catherine Russell, was Biden’s former administrative assistant and is now chief of staff to Biden’s wife, Jill. During the transition, Biden told James Jones that he didn’t want his own N.S.C. but wanted to be able to call on the N.S.C. as needed. Jones complied; on the first day in office, he told his staff, “You work for the president and the vice president.” National-security aides routinely accompany Biden on his foreign trips. As one policymaker who was not authorized to comment publicly on internal administration issues said to me: “I don’t in my head distinguish between Office of the Vice President people and N.S.C. people. We’re all the White House staff.”
Whether such a sweeping statement is full reality or a variation of reality and wishful thinking, there seems little doubt that the style and substance of the Bush and the Obama administrations are quite different.
THE MEDIATOR So far, Biden has avoided the White House infighting that marked Cheney’s tenure.
The difference between Biden’s role and Cheney’s has at least as much to do with the culture of the two administrations as it does with the men themselves. Bush’s discomfort with world affairs created a vacuum that Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and others fought to fill. Moreover, Bush’s tendency toward the snap judgment and the gut call undermined the formal policy process in favor of jockeying for position at key moments. By contrast, there is little question where foreign policy is now decided — in the Oval Office — and the absence of a San Andreas fault line has as much to do with clarity of authority as it does with personal vibes. What’s more, as the agonizingly deliberative debate over policy in Afghanistan has demonstrated, Obama wants to hear a case fully argued out before reaching a conclusion, even at some political risk. This perfectly suits Biden, a gifted expostulator and an indifferent schemer.
Biden is described as a knowledgable Washington hand, experienced in foreign policy matters, and the like.
“When you’re talking about a country which has an 85 percent rate of illiteracy, which has virtually no history of modern governance, you should go in with an overwhelming dose of humility,” he told me. “And you’d better damn well have as precise a notion as you can of what your objective is.”
Saying virtually is, perhaps, being kind.
Biden and those around him do not seem to believe that McChrystal’s strategy can work — not because they question the abilities of the military, but because they think the generals are far too optimistic about the civilian elements upon which the overall plan depends. They are deeply skeptical that the government of President Hamid Karzai can somehow gain legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people; that the U.S. can quickly develop the enormous civilian capacity that would accompany a military surge, or can train as many as 400,000 Afghan soldiers, especially with attrition rates now running around 25 percent; that Pakistan will accept a policy designed to bolster Afghanistan’s Pashtun-led government; that NATO allies will overcome public resistance to offer major help; or that the U.S. can afford to spend something like $250 billion on Afghanistan at a time when deficits are already running very high.
Key point there: Pakistan accepting a Pashtun-led Afghani government.
If Al Qaeda can be bottled up on the border with Pakistan through counterterrorism measures involving troops as well as drone attacks, and with the help of an expanded Afghan army, then it is unnecessary to build a secure Afghanistan that can defeat the Taliban.
And perhaps provide a handle on an exit strategy?
Patient and humble are not words that come to mind when you think of Joe Biden; yet even his limitations may suit him for this new world. Biden is the one who knows many little things but no big thing. As gifted as he is at retail politics, he has none of Barack Obama’s talent for the sweeping formulation or inspirational language, which perhaps explains why he has fared so poorly in presidential campaigns. Biden does not project even slightly in the realm of myth. But for this very reason, he is allergic to magical, wish-fulfillment thinking. “Guys,” he’ll say — this is how he describes addressing the Joint Chiefs of Staff — “what if it doesn’t work?” An administration full of youthful true believers, enraptured with their heroic leader, needs a skeptic and a scold. Obama may need one himself. And yet Biden is also, like Obama, an optimist. As vice presidents go, he has more in common with Hubert Humphrey, the happy warrior, than with dark Dick Cheney. He may well, as Tom Lehrer once sang of Humphrey, dream of staging a coup; but he is likely to remain happy as long as he has apple carts to overturn.
An interesting article about Biden as Vice President. His experience in the Senate, his personality, his garrulousness, his role in the Obama administration, his succession of Cheney.
Some details from the story stand out for me.
First, this web and tangle of relationships: while Cheney’s staff fought for dominance with the White House, Biden’s is deeply enmeshed in the policy-making structure. His national-security adviser, Antony J. Blinken, and two other aides are also directors in the National Security Council, while a number of former Biden aides occupy important posts in the N.S.C. Thomas Donilon, deputy national-security adviser and coordinator of policy across agencies, has been a close friend of Biden’s since the 1980s; Donilon’s brother, Michael, is a senior adviser to Biden, and Donilon’s wife, Catherine Russell, was Biden’s former administrative assistant and is now chief of staff to Biden’s wife, Jill. During the transition, Biden told James Jones that he didn’t want his own N.S.C. but wanted to be able to call on the N.S.C. as needed. Jones complied; on the first day in office, he told his staff, “You work for the president and the vice president.” National-security aides routinely accompany Biden on his foreign trips. As one policymaker who was not authorized to comment publicly on internal administration issues said to me: “I don’t in my head distinguish between Office of the Vice President people and N.S.C. people. We’re all the White House staff.”
Whether such a sweeping statement is full reality or a variation of reality and wishful thinking, there seems little doubt that the style and substance of the Bush and the Obama administrations are quite different.
THE MEDIATOR So far, Biden has avoided the White House infighting that marked Cheney’s tenure.
The difference between Biden’s role and Cheney’s has at least as much to do with the culture of the two administrations as it does with the men themselves. Bush’s discomfort with world affairs created a vacuum that Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and others fought to fill. Moreover, Bush’s tendency toward the snap judgment and the gut call undermined the formal policy process in favor of jockeying for position at key moments. By contrast, there is little question where foreign policy is now decided — in the Oval Office — and the absence of a San Andreas fault line has as much to do with clarity of authority as it does with personal vibes. What’s more, as the agonizingly deliberative debate over policy in Afghanistan has demonstrated, Obama wants to hear a case fully argued out before reaching a conclusion, even at some political risk. This perfectly suits Biden, a gifted expostulator and an indifferent schemer.
Biden is described as a knowledgable Washington hand, experienced in foreign policy matters, and the like.
“When you’re talking about a country which has an 85 percent rate of illiteracy, which has virtually no history of modern governance, you should go in with an overwhelming dose of humility,” he told me. “And you’d better damn well have as precise a notion as you can of what your objective is.”
Saying virtually is, perhaps, being kind.
Biden and those around him do not seem to believe that McChrystal’s strategy can work — not because they question the abilities of the military, but because they think the generals are far too optimistic about the civilian elements upon which the overall plan depends. They are deeply skeptical that the government of President Hamid Karzai can somehow gain legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people; that the U.S. can quickly develop the enormous civilian capacity that would accompany a military surge, or can train as many as 400,000 Afghan soldiers, especially with attrition rates now running around 25 percent; that Pakistan will accept a policy designed to bolster Afghanistan’s Pashtun-led government; that NATO allies will overcome public resistance to offer major help; or that the U.S. can afford to spend something like $250 billion on Afghanistan at a time when deficits are already running very high.
Key point there: Pakistan accepting a Pashtun-led Afghani government.
If Al Qaeda can be bottled up on the border with Pakistan through counterterrorism measures involving troops as well as drone attacks, and with the help of an expanded Afghan army, then it is unnecessary to build a secure Afghanistan that can defeat the Taliban.
And perhaps provide a handle on an exit strategy?
Patient and humble are not words that come to mind when you think of Joe Biden; yet even his limitations may suit him for this new world. Biden is the one who knows many little things but no big thing. As gifted as he is at retail politics, he has none of Barack Obama’s talent for the sweeping formulation or inspirational language, which perhaps explains why he has fared so poorly in presidential campaigns. Biden does not project even slightly in the realm of myth. But for this very reason, he is allergic to magical, wish-fulfillment thinking. “Guys,” he’ll say — this is how he describes addressing the Joint Chiefs of Staff — “what if it doesn’t work?” An administration full of youthful true believers, enraptured with their heroic leader, needs a skeptic and a scold. Obama may need one himself. And yet Biden is also, like Obama, an optimist. As vice presidents go, he has more in common with Hubert Humphrey, the happy warrior, than with dark Dick Cheney. He may well, as Tom Lehrer once sang of Humphrey, dream of staging a coup; but he is likely to remain happy as long as he has apple carts to overturn.
Region finds U.S. lacking on Honduras
Scrawl outside a military base where ballots for Sunday's presidential election are stored tells Hondurans not to vote.
Of course, the headline should read Some in Region finds U.S. lacking on Honduras
The ouster of Manuel Zelaya, the Honduran populist president, five months ago propelled the deeply impoverished country onto President Obama’s packed agenda. The question now is whether his administration’s support for the presidential election being held there on Sunday will be seen as a stamp of approval for a coup or, as senior administration members maintain, the beginning of the end of the crisis.
Curiously, when the action went down in Honduras, Latin America as a whole, including Chávez and Ortega, implored the US to step in and fix things. That is, they invited what in other cases they call meddling.
Most countries in the region see it as the former. Haunted by ghosts of authoritarian governments not long in the grave, countries like Brazil, Argentina and Chile have argued that an election held by an illegal government is, by definition, illegal.
Illegal by their standards; some Hondureños see the removal of Zelaya as proper and legal.
They worry that if Mr. Obama appears to set aside that principle in Honduras, where the United States has long been a power broker, what would Washington do if democracy were threatened in a more powerful country where it wields less influence?
What principle? The US has supported the restoration of Zelaya, and an agreement was reached between Zelaya and Micheletti (though not instituted because the Honduran legislature did not ratify it). Is it supposed that other Latin govenments wish the US to impose its will on the Honduran legislature?
Last week, Marco Aurélio García, a senior adviser to the Brazilian president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, said his country “continues to have great hopes” for good relations with the United States. But, he added, “the truth is so far we have a strong sense of disappointment.”
O, por favor.
Latin American governments accused the administration of putting pragmatism over principle and of siding with Honduran military officers and business interests whose goal was to use the elections to legitimize the coup.
Pragmatism over principle: what a curious charge to lob. Curious charge made by, say, the Chavista government that has installed relatives and cronies in positions of power. To say nothing of Cuba. This is an argument with nothing but subterfuge and cynicism wrapped in the mantle of idealism. Easily dismissed.
“They really thought he was different,” said Julia Sweig of the Council on Foreign Relations, referring to Latin America’s view of Mr. Obama, adding, “But those hopes were dashed over the course of the summer.”
This is all public posturing. In six months there will be different public arguments being waged.
Of course, the headline should read Some in Region finds U.S. lacking on Honduras
The ouster of Manuel Zelaya, the Honduran populist president, five months ago propelled the deeply impoverished country onto President Obama’s packed agenda. The question now is whether his administration’s support for the presidential election being held there on Sunday will be seen as a stamp of approval for a coup or, as senior administration members maintain, the beginning of the end of the crisis.
Curiously, when the action went down in Honduras, Latin America as a whole, including Chávez and Ortega, implored the US to step in and fix things. That is, they invited what in other cases they call meddling.
Most countries in the region see it as the former. Haunted by ghosts of authoritarian governments not long in the grave, countries like Brazil, Argentina and Chile have argued that an election held by an illegal government is, by definition, illegal.
Illegal by their standards; some Hondureños see the removal of Zelaya as proper and legal.
They worry that if Mr. Obama appears to set aside that principle in Honduras, where the United States has long been a power broker, what would Washington do if democracy were threatened in a more powerful country where it wields less influence?
What principle? The US has supported the restoration of Zelaya, and an agreement was reached between Zelaya and Micheletti (though not instituted because the Honduran legislature did not ratify it). Is it supposed that other Latin govenments wish the US to impose its will on the Honduran legislature?
Last week, Marco Aurélio García, a senior adviser to the Brazilian president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, said his country “continues to have great hopes” for good relations with the United States. But, he added, “the truth is so far we have a strong sense of disappointment.”
O, por favor.
Latin American governments accused the administration of putting pragmatism over principle and of siding with Honduran military officers and business interests whose goal was to use the elections to legitimize the coup.
Pragmatism over principle: what a curious charge to lob. Curious charge made by, say, the Chavista government that has installed relatives and cronies in positions of power. To say nothing of Cuba. This is an argument with nothing but subterfuge and cynicism wrapped in the mantle of idealism. Easily dismissed.
“They really thought he was different,” said Julia Sweig of the Council on Foreign Relations, referring to Latin America’s view of Mr. Obama, adding, “But those hopes were dashed over the course of the summer.”
This is all public posturing. In six months there will be different public arguments being waged.
Friday, November 27, 2009
Soviets' Afghan Ordeal Vexed Gates on Troop-Surge Plan
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev also faced a troop-increase request during his first year, for a war he had inherited. Soviet generals in 1985 asked for tens of thousands more soldiers to bolster their 100,000-strong contingent, roughly the same size as the current Western force in Afghanistan.
Mr. Gates, discussing that period in his 1996 memoir "From the Shadows," wrote: "The Soviets had to either reinforce or lose. Because they clearly were not winning." Gen. McChrystal used similar language in his recent warning about possible American "failure" in Afghanistan unless adequate resources are committed. Mr. Gorbachev ended up authorizing a small troop surge; 18 months later, he announced plans for a withdrawal.
The future of the war in Afghanistan was on the line as Gen. Stanley McChrystal met with Defense Secretary Robert Gates in a secret rendezvous at a Belgian airbase in August. Gen. McChrystal, the top Western commander in Afghanistan, pushed for more U.S. troops to roll back the spreading Taliban-led insurgency. Mr. Gates, officials say, was skeptical.
A quarter-century ago, he was a top Central Intelligence Agency officer aiding the anti-Soviet rebels in Afghanistan, and he remembered how a 1985 decision by the Soviet Union to widen that earlier war had failed to turn the tide.
The Soviets left Afghanistan, their southern neighbor, with their collective tail dragging the ground, defeated.
Few American officials know the Soviets' bitter Afghan predicament better than Mr. Gates. In the 1980s, he was the deputy director of the CIA, overseeing a massive U.S. effort to fund, train and equip the Islamic insurgents, called mujahedeen, who fought the Soviet army to a standstill.
Now some of the most prominent of these insurgents, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani, are allied against America with the Taliban and al Qaeda. Almost daily their men are killing Western troops, who often operate from former Soviet bases and use Soviet-drawn military maps with faint Cyrillic markings.
Irony of history?
"It's an eerie sense of deja vu," said Bruce Riedel, a Brookings Institution scholar who headed the Obama administration's Afghan policy review in the spring and who in the 1980s worked under Mr. Gates as a CIA officer in the region. "America," he said, "is in the rare position of fighting the same war twice in one generation, from opposite sides. And it's easier to be the insurgents."
That point is not discussed often: the US is fighting the same war, and this second time it is the object of, not the supporter of, insurgents. Heck, Osama bin Laden was supported by the CIA.
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev also faced a troop-increase request during his first year, for a war he had inherited. Soviet generals in 1985 asked for tens of thousands more soldiers to bolster their 100,000-strong contingent, roughly the same size as the current Western force in Afghanistan.
Mr. Gates, discussing that period in his 1996 memoir "From the Shadows," wrote: "The Soviets had to either reinforce or lose. Because they clearly were not winning." Gen. McChrystal used similar language in his recent warning about possible American "failure" in Afghanistan unless adequate resources are committed. Mr. Gorbachev ended up authorizing a small troop surge; 18 months later, he announced plans for a withdrawal.
Eerie parallel, or mere coincidence?
In Afghanistan's dusty capital, dotted with blast barriers, talk of democracy is hard to square with widespread ballot-stuffing during Mr. Karzai's recent re-election. As for rebuilding, the middle classes here still aspire to live in Soviet-built neighborhoods of decayed housing blocks that would be an eyesore elsewhere but are luxurious by Afghan standards. Despite billions in U.S. aid since 2001 spent on roads, clinics and schools, there is little comparably prominent evidence of American reconstruction.
To us, perhaps things are fixed and fine now, but, what about Afghans?
"What have the Americans done so far? They're only busy building their own military bases," said Mohammad Nassim, a 40-year-old Kabul resident, airing a frequently heard opinion.
The Karzai government fully controls only Kabul, the provincial capitals and a few other areas. Even the main supply roads north and south of Kabul are studded with Taliban checkpoints. All over the country, the Taliban run shadow local administrations, collecting taxes and dispensing justice. "There is a total lack of government authority in rural Afghanistan, which is similar to Soviet times," said Haroun Mir, director of the Afghanistan Center for Research and Policy Studies.
I'm reminded of the South Vietnamese government.
Against all predictions, after the last Soviet soldier left in February 1989, Mr. Najibullah's government, instead of collapsing, went on the offensive. Scoring key victories against the rebels, it outlived the Soviet Union, unraveling only when Russian-supplied food and weapons ran out. Absent continuing American aid for the guerrillas, it could have remained in power much longer, many former mujahedeen say.
Consider the sources, but, nonetheless, the US was quite complicit in the chaos.
Few in Kabul expect the Karzai government would display similar longevity should Western forces go home. "Najibullah had the support of a strong and well-equipped Afghan army, air force and intelligence, and of a strong party," said Mohammed Mohaqeq, a powerful former mujahedeen commander who is a parliament member and a Karzai supporter. "I don't think we can even compare these two governments to each other."
Karzai's government is a straw man. And we are committed to supporting it. A holy mess.
Mr. Gates, discussing that period in his 1996 memoir "From the Shadows," wrote: "The Soviets had to either reinforce or lose. Because they clearly were not winning." Gen. McChrystal used similar language in his recent warning about possible American "failure" in Afghanistan unless adequate resources are committed. Mr. Gorbachev ended up authorizing a small troop surge; 18 months later, he announced plans for a withdrawal.
The future of the war in Afghanistan was on the line as Gen. Stanley McChrystal met with Defense Secretary Robert Gates in a secret rendezvous at a Belgian airbase in August. Gen. McChrystal, the top Western commander in Afghanistan, pushed for more U.S. troops to roll back the spreading Taliban-led insurgency. Mr. Gates, officials say, was skeptical.A quarter-century ago, he was a top Central Intelligence Agency officer aiding the anti-Soviet rebels in Afghanistan, and he remembered how a 1985 decision by the Soviet Union to widen that earlier war had failed to turn the tide.
The Soviets left Afghanistan, their southern neighbor, with their collective tail dragging the ground, defeated.
Few American officials know the Soviets' bitter Afghan predicament better than Mr. Gates. In the 1980s, he was the deputy director of the CIA, overseeing a massive U.S. effort to fund, train and equip the Islamic insurgents, called mujahedeen, who fought the Soviet army to a standstill.
Now some of the most prominent of these insurgents, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani, are allied against America with the Taliban and al Qaeda. Almost daily their men are killing Western troops, who often operate from former Soviet bases and use Soviet-drawn military maps with faint Cyrillic markings.
Irony of history?
"It's an eerie sense of deja vu," said Bruce Riedel, a Brookings Institution scholar who headed the Obama administration's Afghan policy review in the spring and who in the 1980s worked under Mr. Gates as a CIA officer in the region. "America," he said, "is in the rare position of fighting the same war twice in one generation, from opposite sides. And it's easier to be the insurgents."
That point is not discussed often: the US is fighting the same war, and this second time it is the object of, not the supporter of, insurgents. Heck, Osama bin Laden was supported by the CIA.
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev also faced a troop-increase request during his first year, for a war he had inherited. Soviet generals in 1985 asked for tens of thousands more soldiers to bolster their 100,000-strong contingent, roughly the same size as the current Western force in Afghanistan.
Mr. Gates, discussing that period in his 1996 memoir "From the Shadows," wrote: "The Soviets had to either reinforce or lose. Because they clearly were not winning." Gen. McChrystal used similar language in his recent warning about possible American "failure" in Afghanistan unless adequate resources are committed. Mr. Gorbachev ended up authorizing a small troop surge; 18 months later, he announced plans for a withdrawal.
Eerie parallel, or mere coincidence?
In Afghanistan's dusty capital, dotted with blast barriers, talk of democracy is hard to square with widespread ballot-stuffing during Mr. Karzai's recent re-election. As for rebuilding, the middle classes here still aspire to live in Soviet-built neighborhoods of decayed housing blocks that would be an eyesore elsewhere but are luxurious by Afghan standards. Despite billions in U.S. aid since 2001 spent on roads, clinics and schools, there is little comparably prominent evidence of American reconstruction.
To us, perhaps things are fixed and fine now, but, what about Afghans?
"What have the Americans done so far? They're only busy building their own military bases," said Mohammad Nassim, a 40-year-old Kabul resident, airing a frequently heard opinion.
The Karzai government fully controls only Kabul, the provincial capitals and a few other areas. Even the main supply roads north and south of Kabul are studded with Taliban checkpoints. All over the country, the Taliban run shadow local administrations, collecting taxes and dispensing justice. "There is a total lack of government authority in rural Afghanistan, which is similar to Soviet times," said Haroun Mir, director of the Afghanistan Center for Research and Policy Studies.
I'm reminded of the South Vietnamese government.
Against all predictions, after the last Soviet soldier left in February 1989, Mr. Najibullah's government, instead of collapsing, went on the offensive. Scoring key victories against the rebels, it outlived the Soviet Union, unraveling only when Russian-supplied food and weapons ran out. Absent continuing American aid for the guerrillas, it could have remained in power much longer, many former mujahedeen say.
Consider the sources, but, nonetheless, the US was quite complicit in the chaos.
Few in Kabul expect the Karzai government would display similar longevity should Western forces go home. "Najibullah had the support of a strong and well-equipped Afghan army, air force and intelligence, and of a strong party," said Mohammed Mohaqeq, a powerful former mujahedeen commander who is a parliament member and a Karzai supporter. "I don't think we can even compare these two governments to each other."
Karzai's government is a straw man. And we are committed to supporting it. A holy mess.
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
PM Singh visits
On World Focus last evening, host Martin Savidge talked with Amit Pandya (a senior associate at the Stimson Center, an organization dedicated to promoting international peace and security).I found Mr. Pandya a very interesting voice to listen to, insightful, incisive.
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
A Superpower Stirs
Interesting analysis of China's emerging role as a world power. Some nice historical touches add to the interest. And then there are three details that jump out:1. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the U.S. national security adviser under Jimmy Carter, proposed a drastically slimmer G20—a G2, the U.S. and China—to deal with the nuclear threat posed by Iran and North Korea; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; India-Pakistan tensions; climate change.
Interesting, though one wonders how that would go over with the other 18, beginning with Russia.
2. A military parade last month to mark the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China sent a powerful message to China's 1.3 billion people. The intercontinental ballistic missiles that rumbled down Beijing's Avenue of Eternal Peace, and the tanker planes that lumbered overhead, signaled that China not only was at last a strong country, but also could project power beyond its shores.
The CIA's website estimates China's 2008 GDP as $7.992 trillion. It's rated as number 3 in the world. Other numbers are: $7.332 trillion (2007 est.) $6.489 trillion (2006 est.)
Last night on World Focus news I heard a reporter state that China's annual military budget is $75 billion. The CIA website has: Military expenditures: 4.3% of GDP (2006) country comparison to the world: 25. 4.3% of GDP is $ 279,027,000,000.
Now, the US numbers: 4.06% (take a look at that table). GDP:$14.44 trillion (2008 est.) country comparison to the world: 2. (The EU is #1) $14.38 trillion (2007 est.) $14.09 trillion (2006 est.)
3. Some two-and-a-half millennia ago, the Chinese philosopher Laozi wrote: "Governing a large country is like frying a small fish." The advice was aimed at the scholar-officials that ran China—a Mandarin class that became a model of governance for the ancient world. The light touch has never been a hallmark of Communist rule, or of its statecraft. That matters greatly in a world in which influence and legitimacy derive more than ever from the attractiveness of a country's governing ideals.
Really?
Tuesday, November 3, 2009
Trained in the U.S., Scientist Became China's 'Rocket King'
Imaginechina/Associated Press - Scientist Qian Xuesen shown in Beijing, China, in 1957. He died on Oct. 31 at the age of 98
"He was Joe McCarthy's present to the Chinese," says John Logsdon, former director of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University. "It was the anti-Communist mood in the 1950s that led him home."
"He was Joe McCarthy's present to the Chinese," says John Logsdon, former director of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University. "It was the anti-Communist mood in the 1950s that led him home."
Monday, November 2, 2009
Europe Still Likes Obama, but Doubts Creep In
President Nicolas Sarkozy, center, before chiding President Obama on Iran in a speech at the United Nations in September. France wants no deal that would let Iran keep enriching uranium.
Is it principled, or is its opposition because France wants part of the business?
The election of Barack Obama as president seemed to most Europeans to be unadulterated good news, marking an end to the perceived unilateralism and indifference to allied views of former President George W. Bush.
But nine months into Mr. Obama’s presidency, trans-Atlantic relations are again clouded by doubts. Europe and the United States remain at least partly out of sync on Afghanistan, the Middle East, Iran and climate change.
Every love affair is bound to cool.
Many Europeans argue that Mr. Obama has not broken clearly enough with Bush administration policies that they dislike, while some Americans argue that the Europeans are too passive, watching Mr. Obama struggle with difficult issues, like Afghanistan and the detention center at Guantánamo Bay, without providing much substantive help.
Europeans are good at lecturing, at passing judgment, and at self-glorification.
Mr. Obama remains popular with the European public, but a senior European official said that he was worried about an underlying disaffection. “It’s dangerous, because we must not get into a spiral of dissatisfaction on both sides,” he said. These generalizations lack real substance, he said, but the criticism runs that “the U.S. thinks that Europeans don’t want to do anything to help and the Europeans feel that the U.S. is naïve and not delivering enough.”
Naive? Seems a ridiculous criticism, really.
“Europeans are sitting around waiting for Washington to decide what the Afghanistan policy is going to be,” he said.
They are waiting for the US to decide.
A lot of the problem is the fault of the Europeans themselves, said Hubert Védrine, a former French foreign minister. “Europe for Obama is not a priority, not a problem and not a solution for his problems,” he said in an interview here. “Obama keeps a distance and has a kind of hauteur” with European leaders, Mr. Védrine said. “But that’s not a sufficient reason for Europeans to act like spectators” as Mr. Obama tries to cope with his challenges. “I think it’s necessary to help him,” he said.
[Ed: hauteur: arrogance: overbearing pride evidenced by a superior manner toward inferiors]
In a report to be published on Monday, the European Council on Foreign Relations, an independent research group, urged European Union governments to shake off illusions about the trans-Atlantic relationship if they wanted to avoid global irrelevance.
The United States “needs strong partners in a world it no longer dominates,” the authors say, and while it would prefer a more united European Union, which can articulate and put into practice its own strategic interests, Washington no longer expects to see it. When the European Union is united and strong, as on trade matters, Washington listens, the report says; when it is split, as over Russia and many other foreign and defense issues, where national governments act individually, “Europeans are asking to be divided and ruled.”
While Mr. Obama is personally sympathetic and even “European” in his policy choices, the report argues, “Europeans miss the implications of the self-avowed pragmatism” of his administration, which wants “to work with whoever will most effectively help it achieve the outcomes it desires.”
Is it principled, or is its opposition because France wants part of the business?
The election of Barack Obama as president seemed to most Europeans to be unadulterated good news, marking an end to the perceived unilateralism and indifference to allied views of former President George W. Bush.
But nine months into Mr. Obama’s presidency, trans-Atlantic relations are again clouded by doubts. Europe and the United States remain at least partly out of sync on Afghanistan, the Middle East, Iran and climate change.
Every love affair is bound to cool.
Many Europeans argue that Mr. Obama has not broken clearly enough with Bush administration policies that they dislike, while some Americans argue that the Europeans are too passive, watching Mr. Obama struggle with difficult issues, like Afghanistan and the detention center at Guantánamo Bay, without providing much substantive help.
Europeans are good at lecturing, at passing judgment, and at self-glorification.
Mr. Obama remains popular with the European public, but a senior European official said that he was worried about an underlying disaffection. “It’s dangerous, because we must not get into a spiral of dissatisfaction on both sides,” he said. These generalizations lack real substance, he said, but the criticism runs that “the U.S. thinks that Europeans don’t want to do anything to help and the Europeans feel that the U.S. is naïve and not delivering enough.”
Naive? Seems a ridiculous criticism, really.
“Europeans are sitting around waiting for Washington to decide what the Afghanistan policy is going to be,” he said.
They are waiting for the US to decide.
A lot of the problem is the fault of the Europeans themselves, said Hubert Védrine, a former French foreign minister. “Europe for Obama is not a priority, not a problem and not a solution for his problems,” he said in an interview here. “Obama keeps a distance and has a kind of hauteur” with European leaders, Mr. Védrine said. “But that’s not a sufficient reason for Europeans to act like spectators” as Mr. Obama tries to cope with his challenges. “I think it’s necessary to help him,” he said.
[Ed: hauteur: arrogance: overbearing pride evidenced by a superior manner toward inferiors]
In a report to be published on Monday, the European Council on Foreign Relations, an independent research group, urged European Union governments to shake off illusions about the trans-Atlantic relationship if they wanted to avoid global irrelevance.
The United States “needs strong partners in a world it no longer dominates,” the authors say, and while it would prefer a more united European Union, which can articulate and put into practice its own strategic interests, Washington no longer expects to see it. When the European Union is united and strong, as on trade matters, Washington listens, the report says; when it is split, as over Russia and many other foreign and defense issues, where national governments act individually, “Europeans are asking to be divided and ruled.”
While Mr. Obama is personally sympathetic and even “European” in his policy choices, the report argues, “Europeans miss the implications of the self-avowed pragmatism” of his administration, which wants “to work with whoever will most effectively help it achieve the outcomes it desires.”
Friday, October 30, 2009
Honduran restoration
Esteban Felix/Associated Press - Honduras' ousted President Manuel Zelaya surrounded by his supporters, smiles at the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa, Friday. {Ed: Ques la cosa, Esteban?}
A lingering political crisis in Honduras seemed to be nearing an end on Friday after the de facto government agreed to a deal, pending legislative approval, that would allow Manuel Zelaya, the deposed president, to return to office.
The government of Roberto Micheletti, which had refused to let Mr. Zelaya return, signed an agreement with Mr. Zelaya’s negotiators late Thursday that would pave the way for the Honduran Congress to restore the ousted president and allow him to serve out the remaining three months of his term. If Congress agrees, control of the army would shift to the electoral court, and the presidential election set for Nov. 29 would be recognized by both sides. Neither Mr. Zelaya nor Mr. Micheletti will be candidates.
Negotiators for both men were expected to meet Friday to work out final details. It was not clear what would happen if the Honduran Congress rejected the deal.
Latin American governments had pressed the Obama administration to take a forceful approach to ending the political impasse, but Washington had let the Organization of American States take the lead and endorsed negotiations that were brokered by the Costa Rican president, Óscar Arias. But those talks stalled in July.
Yanqi come on down and help. What a twist.
A lingering political crisis in Honduras seemed to be nearing an end on Friday after the de facto government agreed to a deal, pending legislative approval, that would allow Manuel Zelaya, the deposed president, to return to office.
The government of Roberto Micheletti, which had refused to let Mr. Zelaya return, signed an agreement with Mr. Zelaya’s negotiators late Thursday that would pave the way for the Honduran Congress to restore the ousted president and allow him to serve out the remaining three months of his term. If Congress agrees, control of the army would shift to the electoral court, and the presidential election set for Nov. 29 would be recognized by both sides. Neither Mr. Zelaya nor Mr. Micheletti will be candidates.
Negotiators for both men were expected to meet Friday to work out final details. It was not clear what would happen if the Honduran Congress rejected the deal.
Latin American governments had pressed the Obama administration to take a forceful approach to ending the political impasse, but Washington had let the Organization of American States take the lead and endorsed negotiations that were brokered by the Costa Rican president, Óscar Arias. But those talks stalled in July.
Yanqi come on down and help. What a twist.
Tuesday, September 22, 2009
He's back
Ousted President Manuel Zelaya dramatically reappeared in Honduras on Monday, almost three months after being forced out of the country in his pajamas -- sneaking back in and taking refuge in the Brazilian Embassy.
"I am here for the restoration of democracy," Mr. Zelaya said on Honduran television. He told local media he wanted to "initiate a national and international dialogue" that would permit his return to power.
Amazingly, he can say this with a straight face.
Close ally Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez said Mr. Zelaya told him he traveled with four companions. Mr. Chávez hailed Mr. Zelaya's return and said his country stood ready to help him return to power.
And this guy, too. Were anyone to say what he says about Venezuela, he would charge interference with internal, sovereign matters.
It was unclear what Mr. Zelaya would do next. He has the support of the international community as well as the U.S., which canceled the visas of many officials in the interim government, and cut some aid to Honduras, one of the hemisphere's poorest countries. However, Mr. Zelaya's return is vehemently opposed by the country's institutions, including the congress, the courts, the armed forces and the powerful Catholic Church.
International community as well as the US?
"I am here for the restoration of democracy," Mr. Zelaya said on Honduran television. He told local media he wanted to "initiate a national and international dialogue" that would permit his return to power.
Amazingly, he can say this with a straight face.
Close ally Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez said Mr. Zelaya told him he traveled with four companions. Mr. Chávez hailed Mr. Zelaya's return and said his country stood ready to help him return to power.
And this guy, too. Were anyone to say what he says about Venezuela, he would charge interference with internal, sovereign matters.
It was unclear what Mr. Zelaya would do next. He has the support of the international community as well as the U.S., which canceled the visas of many officials in the interim government, and cut some aid to Honduras, one of the hemisphere's poorest countries. However, Mr. Zelaya's return is vehemently opposed by the country's institutions, including the congress, the courts, the armed forces and the powerful Catholic Church.
International community as well as the US?
Friday, September 18, 2009
Scaling back Reagan’s starry vision
The new plan that President Obama laid out for a missile shield against Iran on Thursday turns Ronald Reagan’s vision of a Star Wars system on its head: Rather than focusing first on protecting the continental United States, it shifts the immediate effort to defending Europe and the Middle East.
It is a long way from the impermeable shield that President Reagan described in glowing terms in 1983, an announcement that turned into a diplomatic triumph even while it was a technological flop. Ever since, missile defense has always been more about international politics than about new military technology.
That's the rub of it: Reagan said it would be a magnificent technological wonder that would make the US safe from all missiles, but it has never been built. That is so typical of Reagan and Reaganisms: tell it, make it sound great, and ignore the fact that it is untrue (also known as a lie).
That standoff has fed the conviction inside the White House that the Iranian threat needs to be countered. But officials argued Thursday that the faster, and surer, way to accomplish that goal was to scrap Mr. Bush’s plan, which would have based antimissile batteries too far from Iran to be useful against short- and medium-range missiles, and put them closer to Tehran.
Mr. Obama’s critics argue that while Iran is rightly a major focus of missile defense, it is not the only one, and that in dismantling the Bush plan, the new president is undercutting American allies.
“I fear the administration’s decision will do just that,” Senator John McCain, Mr. Obama’s Republican rival in last year’s presidential election, said Thursday, adding that the decision came “at a time when Eastern European nations are increasingly wary of renewed Russian adventurism.”
Russian adventurism, such as it is, as in its standoff with Georgia, isn't much,
But Mr. Obama is betting that over time he can assuage bruised feelings in Europe. And he is betting that his credibility will rise in the Middle East, where he can now argue that the American missile shield will defend both Israel and the Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia and Egypt. There are signs that all of them may be interested in nuclear capabilities of their own — especially if they believe that the United States will not stand up to Iran.
Realpolitik.
So Mr. Obama faces the same challenge as Mr. Reagan: Winning the argument that his version of missile defense is workable — or at least workable enough to be a potent political weapon.
Making the primary aim of the missile system political.
It is a long way from the impermeable shield that President Reagan described in glowing terms in 1983, an announcement that turned into a diplomatic triumph even while it was a technological flop. Ever since, missile defense has always been more about international politics than about new military technology.
That's the rub of it: Reagan said it would be a magnificent technological wonder that would make the US safe from all missiles, but it has never been built. That is so typical of Reagan and Reaganisms: tell it, make it sound great, and ignore the fact that it is untrue (also known as a lie).
That standoff has fed the conviction inside the White House that the Iranian threat needs to be countered. But officials argued Thursday that the faster, and surer, way to accomplish that goal was to scrap Mr. Bush’s plan, which would have based antimissile batteries too far from Iran to be useful against short- and medium-range missiles, and put them closer to Tehran.
Mr. Obama’s critics argue that while Iran is rightly a major focus of missile defense, it is not the only one, and that in dismantling the Bush plan, the new president is undercutting American allies.
“I fear the administration’s decision will do just that,” Senator John McCain, Mr. Obama’s Republican rival in last year’s presidential election, said Thursday, adding that the decision came “at a time when Eastern European nations are increasingly wary of renewed Russian adventurism.”
Russian adventurism, such as it is, as in its standoff with Georgia, isn't much,
But Mr. Obama is betting that over time he can assuage bruised feelings in Europe. And he is betting that his credibility will rise in the Middle East, where he can now argue that the American missile shield will defend both Israel and the Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia and Egypt. There are signs that all of them may be interested in nuclear capabilities of their own — especially if they believe that the United States will not stand up to Iran.
Realpolitik.
So Mr. Obama faces the same challenge as Mr. Reagan: Winning the argument that his version of missile defense is workable — or at least workable enough to be a potent political weapon.
Making the primary aim of the missile system political.
Shielded
The decision, which he announced this morning after completing a six-month review of the program, removes the biggest obstacle in U.S.-Russian relations—a step that could clear the way for cooperative measures on a wide range of international issues—without scrapping the general idea of some sort of "missile shield" for Europe.
Conservatives in the US and Poland are howling. But this isn't a decision made by the President in a vacuum.
Bush came up with the plan to put 10 anti-missile interceptors and radars on Czech and Polish soil in 2007, and the Russians have been clamoring about it ever since. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin accused Bush of trying to upset the balance of power.
10 interceptors aren't much, but their symbolism meant something to both sides.
Bush's top officials, including his (and now Obama's) defense secretary, Robert Gates, tried to persuade Putin that such fears had no basis. The interceptors would be configured to shoot down missiles launched by Iran, not by Russia. And in any case, a mere 10 interceptors were hardly a counterweight to the thousands of offensive missiles in Russia's nuclear arsenal.
How conservative Republicans can howl against President Obama, given that Secretary Gates is a carry-over from the previous Administration is something they choose to ignore. Facts do not drive their arguments, but only serve as a launching pad to criticize anything, and everything, the President does.
The argument was correct but also beside the point. The Russians were worried not so much about what 10 interceptors could do but rather about what they represented—a U.S. military foothold in the heart of Eastern Europe.
Russia did not like Poland becoming part of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization).
The anti-missile weapons that Bush wanted to put in the Czech Republic and Poland were the same weapons that he was installing, as part of the larger missile-defense program, in Fort Greely, Alaska. These weapons, known as GBI (for Ground-Based Interceptors), are huge multi-staged rockets, about the size of Minuteman ICBMs, and, like them, are deployed in blast-resistant, underground silos—literally dug and hardened into the soil. The GBI complex in Alaska is spread out across 600 acres and includes a large X-Band radar system and 200 military personnel, as well as a security presence along the surrounding roads.
NATO member countries:
Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Rep, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States
Russia has long been nervous about the expansion of NATO into its former imperial realm. The prospect of a large, fixed military installation in this realm—not quite a nuclear weapon (the GBI carries a "kill vehicle" that smashes into its target rather than a nuclear warhead) but, still, a weapon related to the U.S. nuclear program—was going a step too far.
Russia is certainly shown to be weak by NATO's expansion (even Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are members), but it does retain some influence and power.
When Obama met with Putin and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in July, the missile-defense plan still rankled; the Russian leaders said that they liked the new American president's words (the "reset button" and so forth), but they were still waiting for his deeds. Obama's announcement this morning constitutes a substantial deed.
Secretary Gates, in a follow-up press conference, emphasized that, contrary to a Wall Street Journal headline, Obama was not "scrapping missile defense in Europe." Rather, he was adjusting the program. Rather than building huge, fixed GBI complexes in Eastern Europe, he would buy more small, mobile SM-3 missiles and place them, initially, on the U.S. Navy's Aegis cruisers.
The Journal never lets mere facts get in the way of its right-wing agenda, its slanting of news to emphasize an anti-Obama view.
At some point, no earlier than 2015, the SM-3s might also be deployed on ground bases in northern or southern Europe, "in consultation with allies," Gates said, "starting with Poland and the Czech Republic." (Notice: He didn't say the anti-missile missiles might be based in those two countries—though that's not out of the question—only that those countries would be the first consulted on the matter. A more likely base, if Iranian missiles are the concern, would be Turkey, though Gates didn't say that, either.)
Matters are postponed for six years, a large window of time when much can get done.
The SM-3s are capable of shooting down short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, unlike the GBI, which is designed to shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles. But Obama and Gates said this morning that this feature is appropriate, since recent intelligence indicates that Iran is making faster progress on developing shorter-range missiles and much slower progress on ICBMs.
In other words, Gates claimed, Obama's plan provides "a better missile-defense capability" for Europe—a plan that is more flexible, less vulnerable, and better suited to the actual threat than the plan that he himself advocated three years ago under President Bush.
Spin, baby, spin.
Is this true, or is it post-hoc rationalization? A bit of both.
Spin.
For one thing, Bush's plan to put GBI complexes in Poland and the Czech Republic was not meant to defend Europe. Rather, the initial discussions of a European missile-defense plan, in 2003-04, focused on using these weapons to shoot down missiles launched by Iran as they passed over Europe on their way to the United States. The interceptors could provide protection for some parts of Europe, but that wasn't the main intent.
So, yes, to the extent the SM-3s work, they would protect Europe more than Bush's plan would have. Whether they work—whether they really can shoot down ballistic missiles—is another question. Certainly, short-range missiles are easier to shoot down than ICBMs: they travel more slowly, their trajectory is easier to track, their warheads are smaller, meaning there's less room for decoys or other devices to throw off the missile-defense system's radar.
In some ways, though, the question hardly matters. Obama has made little secret of his skepticism about the missile-defense program as it existed under the Bush administration. He has said, in past speeches, that he would support a missile-defense program if it proved effective in tests, knowing full well that the program—the larger program, involving the GBI complexes—has performed rather poorly in tests. (The SM-3s have done better against short-range missiles, though little information has been released about the precise design of those tests.)
Obama also clearly wants to revive relations with Russia—a goal that he and many of his advisers view as critical to the success of his broader policies to fight global terrorism and to curb nuclear proliferation. The plan to put missile defenses in Eastern Europe was seen by the Russians as a threat, an attitude that isn't unreasonable from their point of view. It seems silly to throw a wrench in this relationship—and thus sharply reduce the chance of success in these vital areas—in order to preserve a missile-defense system that doesn't seem likely to work anyway.
However, it is impolitic—it risks rousing accusations of being "soft on defense" or worse—for any president (or most senators and House members) to say out loud that missile defense isn't likely to work and that, therefore, the program should be scrapped. (I'm not saying that Obama thinks this; I'm saying only that if he does think this, he couldn't say it.)
Obama's plan—scuttling the GBI complexes in Eastern Europe and instead putting more SM-3s on Aegis cruisers, which can be put in the Mediterranean or anywhere—manages to undercut the Russians' rationale for continuing their intransigence while, at the same time, it assures the Europeans that the United States will continue to provide a defense against missile attacks, that it will in fact do so more quickly and effectively than the original plan would have.
Still, two questions remain to be answered.
First, what will Obama do to provide special reassurances to the Czech Republic and Poland? To the extent that their people fear a resurgent Russia's aggression (and, given the history, such fears aren't out of line), those big, fixed GBI complexes would have been a tangible token of American commitment to their defense. The NATO treaty's obligations are one thing, and hardly trivial, but the presence of a strategic asset, like a missile-defense complex, would guarantee full protection from—and therefore stand as a potent deterrent to—an attack or intimidation by Russia.
This doesn't mean the United States should install the complexes, whether in Poland and the Czech Republic or in any other country that desires a security umbrella. The Turks were disappointed in 1963 when President John F. Kennedy dismantled the 15 Jupiter nuclear missiles that had recently been deployed there. (It was a secret at the time, but he did this as part of the deal with Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev to end the Cuban missile crisis.) He assured the Turks that a new Polaris submarine, armed with 16 nuclear missiles, would be stationed in the Mediterranean instead. To the Turks, this wasn't the same thing: A Polaris could move away, a Jupiter couldn't. But surely Kennedy did the right thing. Those 15 Jupiters weren't worth risking war with the Soviet Union, and the Polaris was a much less vulnerable, and therefore more effective, deterrent.
At least in the current case with the Czechs and the Poles, the GBI complexes haven't yet been built: Obama isn't dismantling anything; he's merely saying that he's not moving forward with the previous president's plan, which was always controversial. Still, he should devise and offer some set of extra assurances.
The second question is more important: What will the Russians do now? They've cited the missile-defense plan as the main source of suspicion, the main obstacle to improved relations. Now that Obama has wiped it off the board, will Putin and Medvedev come around—or will they bring up some other reason, some other excuse, for remaining distant and occasionally hostile? It's in the Kremlin's court.
Conservatives in the US and Poland are howling. But this isn't a decision made by the President in a vacuum.
Bush came up with the plan to put 10 anti-missile interceptors and radars on Czech and Polish soil in 2007, and the Russians have been clamoring about it ever since. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin accused Bush of trying to upset the balance of power.
10 interceptors aren't much, but their symbolism meant something to both sides.
Bush's top officials, including his (and now Obama's) defense secretary, Robert Gates, tried to persuade Putin that such fears had no basis. The interceptors would be configured to shoot down missiles launched by Iran, not by Russia. And in any case, a mere 10 interceptors were hardly a counterweight to the thousands of offensive missiles in Russia's nuclear arsenal.
How conservative Republicans can howl against President Obama, given that Secretary Gates is a carry-over from the previous Administration is something they choose to ignore. Facts do not drive their arguments, but only serve as a launching pad to criticize anything, and everything, the President does.
The argument was correct but also beside the point. The Russians were worried not so much about what 10 interceptors could do but rather about what they represented—a U.S. military foothold in the heart of Eastern Europe.
Russia did not like Poland becoming part of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization).
The anti-missile weapons that Bush wanted to put in the Czech Republic and Poland were the same weapons that he was installing, as part of the larger missile-defense program, in Fort Greely, Alaska. These weapons, known as GBI (for Ground-Based Interceptors), are huge multi-staged rockets, about the size of Minuteman ICBMs, and, like them, are deployed in blast-resistant, underground silos—literally dug and hardened into the soil. The GBI complex in Alaska is spread out across 600 acres and includes a large X-Band radar system and 200 military personnel, as well as a security presence along the surrounding roads.
NATO member countries:
Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Rep, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States
Russia has long been nervous about the expansion of NATO into its former imperial realm. The prospect of a large, fixed military installation in this realm—not quite a nuclear weapon (the GBI carries a "kill vehicle" that smashes into its target rather than a nuclear warhead) but, still, a weapon related to the U.S. nuclear program—was going a step too far.
Russia is certainly shown to be weak by NATO's expansion (even Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are members), but it does retain some influence and power.
When Obama met with Putin and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in July, the missile-defense plan still rankled; the Russian leaders said that they liked the new American president's words (the "reset button" and so forth), but they were still waiting for his deeds. Obama's announcement this morning constitutes a substantial deed.
Secretary Gates, in a follow-up press conference, emphasized that, contrary to a Wall Street Journal headline, Obama was not "scrapping missile defense in Europe." Rather, he was adjusting the program. Rather than building huge, fixed GBI complexes in Eastern Europe, he would buy more small, mobile SM-3 missiles and place them, initially, on the U.S. Navy's Aegis cruisers.
The Journal never lets mere facts get in the way of its right-wing agenda, its slanting of news to emphasize an anti-Obama view.
At some point, no earlier than 2015, the SM-3s might also be deployed on ground bases in northern or southern Europe, "in consultation with allies," Gates said, "starting with Poland and the Czech Republic." (Notice: He didn't say the anti-missile missiles might be based in those two countries—though that's not out of the question—only that those countries would be the first consulted on the matter. A more likely base, if Iranian missiles are the concern, would be Turkey, though Gates didn't say that, either.)
Matters are postponed for six years, a large window of time when much can get done.
The SM-3s are capable of shooting down short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, unlike the GBI, which is designed to shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles. But Obama and Gates said this morning that this feature is appropriate, since recent intelligence indicates that Iran is making faster progress on developing shorter-range missiles and much slower progress on ICBMs.
In other words, Gates claimed, Obama's plan provides "a better missile-defense capability" for Europe—a plan that is more flexible, less vulnerable, and better suited to the actual threat than the plan that he himself advocated three years ago under President Bush.
Spin, baby, spin.
Is this true, or is it post-hoc rationalization? A bit of both.
Spin.
For one thing, Bush's plan to put GBI complexes in Poland and the Czech Republic was not meant to defend Europe. Rather, the initial discussions of a European missile-defense plan, in 2003-04, focused on using these weapons to shoot down missiles launched by Iran as they passed over Europe on their way to the United States. The interceptors could provide protection for some parts of Europe, but that wasn't the main intent.
So, yes, to the extent the SM-3s work, they would protect Europe more than Bush's plan would have. Whether they work—whether they really can shoot down ballistic missiles—is another question. Certainly, short-range missiles are easier to shoot down than ICBMs: they travel more slowly, their trajectory is easier to track, their warheads are smaller, meaning there's less room for decoys or other devices to throw off the missile-defense system's radar.
In some ways, though, the question hardly matters. Obama has made little secret of his skepticism about the missile-defense program as it existed under the Bush administration. He has said, in past speeches, that he would support a missile-defense program if it proved effective in tests, knowing full well that the program—the larger program, involving the GBI complexes—has performed rather poorly in tests. (The SM-3s have done better against short-range missiles, though little information has been released about the precise design of those tests.)
Obama also clearly wants to revive relations with Russia—a goal that he and many of his advisers view as critical to the success of his broader policies to fight global terrorism and to curb nuclear proliferation. The plan to put missile defenses in Eastern Europe was seen by the Russians as a threat, an attitude that isn't unreasonable from their point of view. It seems silly to throw a wrench in this relationship—and thus sharply reduce the chance of success in these vital areas—in order to preserve a missile-defense system that doesn't seem likely to work anyway.
However, it is impolitic—it risks rousing accusations of being "soft on defense" or worse—for any president (or most senators and House members) to say out loud that missile defense isn't likely to work and that, therefore, the program should be scrapped. (I'm not saying that Obama thinks this; I'm saying only that if he does think this, he couldn't say it.)
Obama's plan—scuttling the GBI complexes in Eastern Europe and instead putting more SM-3s on Aegis cruisers, which can be put in the Mediterranean or anywhere—manages to undercut the Russians' rationale for continuing their intransigence while, at the same time, it assures the Europeans that the United States will continue to provide a defense against missile attacks, that it will in fact do so more quickly and effectively than the original plan would have.
Still, two questions remain to be answered.
First, what will Obama do to provide special reassurances to the Czech Republic and Poland? To the extent that their people fear a resurgent Russia's aggression (and, given the history, such fears aren't out of line), those big, fixed GBI complexes would have been a tangible token of American commitment to their defense. The NATO treaty's obligations are one thing, and hardly trivial, but the presence of a strategic asset, like a missile-defense complex, would guarantee full protection from—and therefore stand as a potent deterrent to—an attack or intimidation by Russia.
This doesn't mean the United States should install the complexes, whether in Poland and the Czech Republic or in any other country that desires a security umbrella. The Turks were disappointed in 1963 when President John F. Kennedy dismantled the 15 Jupiter nuclear missiles that had recently been deployed there. (It was a secret at the time, but he did this as part of the deal with Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev to end the Cuban missile crisis.) He assured the Turks that a new Polaris submarine, armed with 16 nuclear missiles, would be stationed in the Mediterranean instead. To the Turks, this wasn't the same thing: A Polaris could move away, a Jupiter couldn't. But surely Kennedy did the right thing. Those 15 Jupiters weren't worth risking war with the Soviet Union, and the Polaris was a much less vulnerable, and therefore more effective, deterrent.
At least in the current case with the Czechs and the Poles, the GBI complexes haven't yet been built: Obama isn't dismantling anything; he's merely saying that he's not moving forward with the previous president's plan, which was always controversial. Still, he should devise and offer some set of extra assurances.
The second question is more important: What will the Russians do now? They've cited the missile-defense plan as the main source of suspicion, the main obstacle to improved relations. Now that Obama has wiped it off the board, will Putin and Medvedev come around—or will they bring up some other reason, some other excuse, for remaining distant and occasionally hostile? It's in the Kremlin's court.
Thursday, September 10, 2009
Why Are Jews Liberals?
One of the most extraordinary features of Barack Obama's victory over John McCain was his capture of 78% of the Jewish vote. To be sure, there was nothing extraordinary about the number itself. Since 1928, the average Jewish vote for the Democrat in presidential elections has been an amazing 75%—far higher than that of any other ethno-religious group.
Yet there were reasons to think that it would be different in 2008. The main one was Israel. Despite some slippage in concern for Israel among American Jews, most of them were still telling pollsters that their votes would be strongly influenced by the positions of the two candidates on the Jewish state. This being the case, Mr. McCain's long history of sympathy with Israel should have given him a distinct advantage over Mr. Obama, whose own history consisted of associating with outright enemies of the Jewish state like the Rev. Jeremiah Wright and the historian Rashid Khalidi.
Guilt by association isn't terribly convincing. More a smear than anything else, its dogmatism is insulting, really.
All the other ethno-religious groups that, like the Jews, formed part of the coalition forged by Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the 1930s have followed the rule that increasing prosperity generally leads to an increasing identification with the Republican Party. But not the Jews. As the late Jewish scholar Milton Himmelfarb said in the 1950s: "Jews earn like Episcopalians"—then the most prosperous minority group in America—"and vote like Puerto Ricans," who were then the poorest.
Increasing prosperity leads to conservatism: it is true, but also not true: not all liberals are poor.
Most American Jews sincerely believe that their liberalism, together with their commitment to the Democratic Party as its main political vehicle, stems from the teachings of Judaism and reflects the heritage of "Jewish values." But if this theory were valid, the Orthodox would be the most liberal sector of the Jewish community. After all, it is they who are most familiar with the Jewish religious tradition and who shape their lives around its commandments.
The theory he propounds isn't an academic construct but personal beliefs: not so much Jewish values as grounded in the Torah, but middle-class values.
Yet the Orthodox enclaves are the only Jewish neighborhoods where Republican candidates get any votes to speak of. Even more telling is that on every single cultural issue, the Orthodox oppose the politically correct liberal positions taken by most other American Jews precisely because these positions conflict with Jewish law. To cite just a few examples: Jewish law permits abortion only to protect the life of the mother; it forbids sex between men; and it prohibits suicide (except when the only alternatives are forced conversion or incest).
Not being much of a Jewish scholar, I can only wonder why Masada isn't condemned by the Orthodox who are otherwise so politically incorrect, and by this conservative who clearly prides himself in being politically incorrect.
The upshot is that in virtually every instance of a clash between Jewish law and contemporary liberalism, it is the liberal creed that prevails for most American Jews. Which is to say that for them, liberalism has become more than a political outlook. It has for all practical purposes superseded Judaism and become a religion in its own right. And to the dogmas and commandments of this religion they give the kind of steadfast devotion their forefathers gave to the religion of the Hebrew Bible. For many, moving to the right is invested with much the same horror their forefathers felt about conversion to Christianity.
My Lord (pardon the pun), this man is amazing.
All this applies most fully to Jews who are Jewish only in an ethnic sense. Indeed, many such secular Jews, when asked how they would define "a good Jew," reply that it is equivalent to being a good liberal.
Who defines what it is to be Jewish? And what does this man mean by "ethnic"? Culturally? Certainly not based on national origin, the way Italians or Chinese are ethnic.
As a Jew who moved from left to right more than four decades ago, I have been hoping for many years that my fellow Jews would come to see that in contrast to what was the case in the past, our true friends are now located not among liberals, but among conservatives.
Our true friends?
Of course in speaking of the difference between left and right, or between liberals and conservatives, I have in mind a divide wider than the conflict between Democrats and Republicans and deeper than electoral politics. The great issue between the two political communities is how they feel about the nature of American society. With all exceptions duly noted, I think it fair to say that what liberals mainly see when they look at this country is injustice and oppression of every kind—economic, social and political. By sharp contrast, conservatives see a nation shaped by a complex of traditions, principles and institutions that has afforded more freedom and, even factoring in periodic economic downturns, more prosperity to more of its citizens than in any society in human history. It follows that what liberals believe needs to be changed or discarded—and apologized for to other nations—is precisely what conservatives are dedicated to preserving, reinvigorating and proudly defending against attack.
This is the rub: liberals only want to apologize for how bad the country is, only see the bad, while conservatives see the good, want to preserve it, and extol the great country the US is, the best ever. These are stereotypes, and are inaccurate.
Never mind what people think: not all liberals are critics, and not all conservatives are patriots. Considering the historical record is quite imortant; I'll select civil rights as a starting point.
Despite the Civil War being won by the Union, with its declared intent to end slavery and make citizens of freed Negroes, racial discrimination prevailed for decades, both in social custom and in the law. Plessy v. Ferguson upheld the constitutionality of segregation, further embedding racism into the social fabric.
Negroes petitioned for their rights, but society wasn't interested in granting them. Keeping things as they were, resisting change, was the conservative position. Yet Negroes were not interested in remaining second-class citizens, and over time their demands grew stronger: bus boycott, marches, sit-ins were tactics used to insist on their equality before the law. Some whites sympathized with their plight, considered that it was morally wrong for society to be segregated, morally wrong for black people to be discriminated against, and joined the protests. Those were liberals. Yes, they saw something wrong with society, and considered change important. Racism was unjust. Blacks were oppressed. And liberals worked for change. In doing so, liberals wanted their black brethren to be treated equally, and considered that by changing society the United States would become a better country.
Conservatives opposed change. They saw society as being undermined by the agitation of Negroes and of those liberals who foolishly joined them. They wanted the status quo to prevail. They saw communists in the civil rights movement, and charged that reds were agitating, were riling up Negroes, all to carry out their wicked scheme of destroying American society.
One example, but a telling one. And, not the only example of conservatives opposing change. Women's rights, beginning with the right for to vote, were also opposed by conservatives. It is not that conservatives want to preserve the greatness of American society, to protect it against the dangerous designs of liberals. In opposing change, conservatives oppose
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